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.SELF-INTERESTED: PROTECTING THE CULTURAL AND
RELIGIOUS PRIVACY OF NATIVE AMERICANS THROUGH




According to its history, the Havasupai tribe has lived in the Grand Canyon
since the beginning of human existence.' The Havasupai believe that the
Grand Canyon is the birthplace of the human race, and that the tribe is charged
with the sacred duty of protecting the canyon.2 Recently, members of the
Havasupai tribe donated blood samples for diabetes research to scientists at the
University of Arizona.3 Without the Havasupai's knowledge, some
researchers published scholarly studies indicating that the Havasupai are
genetically predisposed to schizophrenia and that the Havasupai tribe as a
whole is descended from groups of people that migrated from Asia.4 This
unauthorized research contravened some of the most basic precepts of
Havasupai religious belief and caused a great deal of pain in the community.s
There is nothing more personal and private than an individual's genetic
makeup. As scientific technology progresses, DNA samples are more
frequently used in research, and these samples create a risk of "reveal[ing]
highly personal and potentially stigmatizing facts" about a donor's genetic
makeup and heredity.6 The information that can be gleaned from studying
genetic samples is vast and largely unprotected by current law, which provides
no judicially enforceable property rights in one's own body or the products
derived therefrom. Accordingly, anyone whose genetic information is violated
for research purposes has very little legal recourse.
* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Leslie E. Wolf, Advancing Research on StoredBiological Materials: Reconciling Law,
Ethics, and Practice, 11 MINN. J.L. Sc. & TECH. 99, 119 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1067 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1070.
6. Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic Diaries: An Analysis ofPrivacy Protection in DNA
Data Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 185, 208 (1996).
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But the issue of genetic privacy is even more compelling for members of
Native American tribes. Their genetic uniqueness makes these people a target
of interest of many researchers. Unfortunately, researchers sometimes conduct
studies in a manner that is offensive to tribes and tribal members, and without
property rights in their bodies, tribes have little power to pursue claims against
researchers who have "stolen" genetic information from their members.
Courts should recognize property interests in tribal genetic materials for
several reasons. Allowing tribal members to maintain property interests in
their unique genetic composition allows tribes to ensure that the religious and
cultural privacy of their members is protected. If tribal members retain
property rights in their genetic information, tribal government and spiritual
leaders can decide if and how that information is shared with researchers or
other interested parties.
This comment will illustrate why all individuals should be afforded tangible
property rights in their own bodies, and why the need for recognizing such
rights is even more compelling within the Native American community. Part
II of this comment examines the history of property interests in the human
body and the attendant case law. Part III examines numerous examples of
federal legislation that espouse preserving the cultural and religious freedoms
of Native American tribes. Part IV considers the facts of the Havasupai case
to give a more concrete example of why current laws are inadequate to protect
the cultural and religious privacy of Native American tribes. Part V analyzes
whether any claims currently available to individuals and tribes are sufficient
to protect cultural and religious privacy, and explains why claims based on
property rights are more appropriate to address these wrongs. Part VI
concludes that courts should take the responsibility to acknowledge that all
individuals, especially Native Americans, have recognizable property interests
in their bodies.
II. Property Interests in Body Parts
Traditionally, property is defined as "the series of enforceable rights to use,
possess, enjoy, exclude, dispose, and destroy" a thing.' "Ownership" is tied
directly to these legal rights and not to the object itself.' For an individual to
have a legally enforceable property interest in an object, he may possess some
7. Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the
Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 193, 212-13 (1997) [hereinafter Guzman, Property,
Progeny, Body Part].




or all of these rights. Plainly, he need only have one of these legal rights to
say that he has a property interest at all.9 For example, we would describe an
individual who purchases a home as the "owner" of that real property. That
person would have the right to dispose of the property by selling it or the right
to use it as a residence. Even though that person can be described as the owner
of the property, ownership does not give a person every type of potential
property right in that home."o The owner of the property would have the right
to exclude others from his home, but would not have right to exclude those
with easements for public utility from the areas of his property to which they
require workable access." In many situations, the owner of the home would
not own the minerals in the ground underneath his property, despite that he
seems to "own" the property itself.12 He would not be able to use, lease, or sell
these mineral rights because his property interest would be limited to surface
rights. The layman's conception of "ownership" therefore often includes
some, but not all, types of interests in property.
Property rights are recognized by law and are "guaranteed and protected by
government." 3 The definition of property does not enumerate specific items
or categories of objects that may be property, but is intentionally vague so that
courts may "adjust historical precedent to meet the needs of contemporary
economic reality and the unpredictable manifestations of modem life." 4
Property rights thus must change to keep step with the evolution of society and
technology. Courts have modified property laws as technologies advance to
include property interests in such things as human cell lines." These rights
would not have fallen under the framework of protected property interests a
hundred years ago simply because science had not progressed to the point
where such a possibility could even be contemplated. To ensure that property
law legitimately accommodates contemporary problems, courts and
9. Id.; Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing
Property Rights in the Commercial Value ofHuman Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207,219 (1986).
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (Bryan A. Gamer, ed., 9th ed. 2009) ("An owner may
have complete property in the thing or may have parted with some interests in it.").
11. An easement is "[a]n interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the right
to use or control the land, or an area above or below it, for a specific limited purpose." Id. at
585-86.
12. See, e.g., Harris v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 385 F.2d 766, 769 (8th Cir. 1967); Cent.
Coal & Coke Co. v. Carseloway, 45 F.2d 744, 745 (10th Cir. 1930).
13. Hardiman, supra note 9, at 215.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 222.
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legislatures must recognize property interests in the human body and its
genetic information.
A. Property Interests in a Body
It is difficult to think of one's own body as property. Most people feel that
the body is somehow different from other objects that are easily recognized as
property and subject to "ownership," such as a house or a car. With the
normative view of property as "things" rather than "rights," this conceptual
barrier is understandable. Perhaps we feel that the body is something that
cannot be property because owning, buying, or selling another person offends
our morality. Yet these scruples were not always extended to all members of
society. For a period of time in Western history, a wife was the property of her
husband, and any offenses against her person were offenses against the
property of the man." Though this practice seems abhorrent today, it does
show that women's bodies were once subject to property interests. Moreover,
the atrocious practice of slavery, exercised by many different cultures
throughout history, granted property rights to one person over the life and
person of another.17 Although neither of these examples represents
enlightened legal thinking, they highlight that ownership in the body of
another has been recognized in our past. If our moral sense of right and wrong
compels us to protect individuals from ownership by others, what better way
to safeguard such interests than by recognizing property rights in the human
body? If every man has full property rights in his own body, he cannot be
subject to "ownership" by another. At the same time, he is protected from less
extreme - but nonetheless important - intrusions upon his privacy.
Apart from the reprehensible practices of slavery or gender inequality, past
recognition of property rights in the body was most often discussed in cases
involving harm done to the corpse of a loved one.' 8 Under English common
law, there were no recognized property rights in the corpse of a family member
or in any parts that had been separated from a body.'9 The absence of a legal
property right in the corpse of another is attributed largely to the separation of
legal and ecclesiastical law in England during this time period. There were no
16. Id. at 224.
17. Id. at 224-25.
18. E.g., Williams v. Williams, (1881-82) L.R. 20 Ch. D. 659.
19. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991); Hardiman, supra note 9,
at 225; Markett, supra note 6, at 216; Stephen Ashley Mortinger, Comment, Spleen for Sale:
Moore v. Regents of the University of Cahfornia and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51




property interests in a body at law because ecclesiastical courts had exclusive
legal authority over the bodies of the deceased. 20 Despite that courts of law
had jurisdiction "over the burial grounds and monuments," they had no power
over the body of the deceased.2 This rule forbidding property interests in dead
bodies carried over to early American legal systems, where some states
allowed property interests in the bodies of loved ones, while others did not.22
Later, the idea of quasi-property rights developed, allowing interests in the
corpse of a loved one to be recognized and protected, but not to the same
extent that the law protected other types of property.23
Despite that our notions of what constitutes property may not include the
human body or its genetic information, if individuals are allowed to "use,
possess, enjoy, exclude, dispose, and destroy" their bodies, then they have
recognizable property interests in them.24 Every person may use his own body
and enjoy its fruits within the boundaries of the law. A man may profit from
the manual labor he performs using his own body and enjoy the fruits of his
labor.25 Every person may make provisions for the disposal of his body after
death by choosing to be buried or cremated, as allowable by law.26 Every
person may destroy his body by overexertion, stress, and lifestyle choices that
may diminish one's health and longevity. If individuals may use, possess,
enjoy, exclude others from, dispose of, or destroy their bodies, then they must,
by the definition of property as a "series of enforceable rights," 27 possess
recognizable property interests in their physical bodies.
An individual's rights in his own body should be given the same - if not
more stringent - protections as with any other kind of property because "the
body is central to the individual's sense of identity."" Unfortunately, this is
an area of the law that is moving much more slowly than the rapid progress in
medical technology." Medical procedures that were unimaginable decades
ago now take place on a regular basis, and living individuals often have body
parts or fluids separated from their bodies. Human tissues are often stored in
20. Hardiman, supra note 9, at 226.
21. Id.
22. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481.
23. Id.
24. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part, supra note 7, at 212-13.
25. Hardiman, supra note 9, at 229.
26. See In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978).
27. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part, supra note 7, at 212-13.
28. Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right
in Human Bodies, 69 TEx. L. REv. 209, 239-40 (1990).
29. See Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part, supra note 7, at 196-97.
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research facilities for many years, and the original donor of the tissue may not
even remember that it was taken for research. It is now possible for
individuals to donate organs, tissues, and bodily fluids for various purposes,
and individual property interests in these bodily objects should be protected.
B. Property Interests in an Organ, by Any Other Name, Are Still Property
Interests
Even if differing minds cannot agree whether there are already recognized
property interests in the human body, there is both judicial precedent and
statutory support for recognizing property interests in vital organs.30 Though
the right is not usually labeled as a property right, it functions as such. For
example, statutes in a majority of states support the right of an individual to
determine if and when he will donate organs and for what purpose these bodily
tissues will be used.' These laws protect the right of an individual to dispose
of his organs by donating them to a particular person, to a specific educational
or research facility, or to an organ donation bank.32 If an individual is
permitted the legal right to determine the use, disposal, and possession of his
organs, then he has many of the incidents of property "ownership."
1. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) allows donors to make
anatomical gifts of their bodies or organs by will, by affirmative statement, or
by registration for a donor card or some similar type of document." The
decision to donate one's body or organs must be made and expressed by the
donor during life, and if the decision is recorded appropriately, the conveyance
of the anatomical gift takes place after the donor's death.34 In effect, the Act
allows individuals to make decisions about whether their organs will be
removed from their bodies after death, and for what purposes they will be
used. When an individual decides to donate his body or body parts, he may
do so for the purpose of "transplantation, therapy, research, or education."
The type and manner of donations allowed under the UAGA seem to embrace
the property interests of disposition, use, exclusion, and possession. Although
the UAGA does not support the proposition that the human body is indistinct
30. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT §§ 4-5, 20 (2006).
31. Id. § 4 cmt.; 22A Am. JUR. 2d Dead Bodies § 92 (2010).
32. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4 cmt. (2006).
33. Id. § 5.
34. Id. §§ 4-5 cmts.




from other property, "it does recognize rights in the human body that can be
classified as property rights."
The UAGA recognizes that the choice to become an organ donor is an
extremely personal decision, and gives this authority only to the individual, to
the parent of a minor child, or to an individual's guardian or agent.3 7 Even
after the decision has been made to become a donor, the UAGA allows for
revocation at any time, and this revocation is binding.38 The Act states that "an
individual's unrevoked refusal to make an anatomical gift of the individual's
body or part bars all others from later making an anatomical gift of the body
or part,"39 thus protecting the bodily integrity and intent of the decedent. The
UAGA places the intent of the donor before all other considerations, allowing
individuals to decide if and how their bodies or body parts will be used for
organ donation or research.
The dispositions of organs made within the framework of the UAGA are
carried out in much the same way as the death-time disposition of property
made within a will. Both a will and a donor card must be completed during
the life of the individual.40 Organ donation under the UAGA is at all times
revocable, and wills, by their very nature, are as well.4 1 In both cases, the
transfer of the property, whether tangible personal property, real property, or
an organ, is made after the death of the individual. When dispositions of
property are made in a will, courts attempt fully to effectuate the intent of the
testator.42 If such latitude is given to testators when they write wills disposing
of their personal property, the same deference should be given to the
autonomous choices of donors to convey property interests in their organs to
research or transplantation facilities. The importance of personal autonomy
surrounding the disposition and use of one's property or one's body after death
is the same whether an individual is conveying a vital organ for
36. Hardiman, supra note 9, at 216-17.
37. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4.
3 8. Id. § 6.
39. Id. § 7 cmt.
40. Id. § 5; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 (1999).
41. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6; Mark Glover, Formal Execution and Informal
Revocation: Manifestations ofProbate's Family Protection Policy, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
411, 440 (2009) ("[O]ne of the inherent characteristics of a will is its revocability.") (quoting
I PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 21.1 (William J. Bowe et al. eds., 2003)) (alteration in
original).
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1(g)
(1999).
No. 2]1 735
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transplantation, his body for scientific research, or tangible assets for the
benefit of loved ones.
Although the UAGA is not binding federal law,43 it has been adopted by
many states, including Arizona, where the Havasupai live." The widespread
adoption of statutes based on the UAGA shows a "general policy concerning
an individual's authority to control the use of a donated body part."45 While
the Act does not cover donations of blood or other bodily fluids, it recognizes
that a donor has a strong interest in determining how a part of his body will be
used after removal from his person.46 Although some may hesitate to call
these rights "property interests," the UAGA grants individuals the right to
dispose of their organs and bodies through donation, and the power of
disposition is a recognized property right.47 Because individuals are permitted
to transfer their body parts under the UAGA for use, possession, exclusion,
and disposition by research and educational institutes, they have functional
property interests in their organs and bodies.
2. Moore v. Regents of the University of California
A famous California case did very little to clarify what type of interest a
person has in his organs. The Supreme Court of California discussed whether
a conversion action could be maintained in the context of human tissue
misused in medical research.4 8 The plaintiff, Moore, "underwent treatment for
hairy-cell leukemia at the Medical Center of the University of California at
Los Angeles," where he was under the care of Dr. Golde. 49 At Dr. Golde's
recommendation, Moore agreed to have his spleen removed, and allowed
UCLA Medical Center staff to take repeated samples of "his blood, blood
serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm."o Dr. Golde told Moore that
a splenectomy "was necessary to slow down the progress of his disease,"" and
that the collection of specimens was needed to monitor Moore's health and
43. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFT ACT. § 1.
44. Id.; Aluz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-844 (2007).
45. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 501 (Cal. 1990) (Broussard, J.,
dissenting). The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act has been adopted in thirty-nine states. UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 1.
46. Moore, 793 P.2d at 501-02 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
47. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part, supra note 7, at 212-13.
48. Moore, 793 P.2d at 480.
49. Id. at 480-81.





medical treatment.12 What Moore was not told was that his spleen and bodily
fluids would be used for research and for the development of a cell line by the
UCLA Medical Center.53
The Supreme Court of California considered whether the common law
action of conversion should be extended to cover situations where body parts
or bodily fluids are the "property" in question.54 Although the court expressed
a desire to protect personal autonomy, it found that the societal value of
medical research precluded extending conversion to cover this situation."
After weighing competing social interests, the Supreme Court of California
found that Moore did not have any property interests in his cells, and thus
could not bring an action for conversion against his doctor or the medical
center.56
Justice Broussard, in his dissenting opinion, wrote that
the pertinent inquiry is not whether a patient generally retains an
ownership interest in a body part after its removal from his body,
but rather whether a patient has a right to determine, before a body
part is removed, the use to which the part will be put after
removal."
Justice Broussard believed that allowing Moore to bring a claim for conversion
was not an extension of the principle of conversion, as the majority indicated,
but a proper application of common law conversion. If the allegations of
Moore's complaint are taken as true, the defendants "improperly interfered
with plaintiff's right in his body part at a time when he had the authority to
determine the future use of such part." 59 Because the defendants interfered
with Moore's right to determine whether his spleen and other cells would be
used for developing a cell line, Moore should have been allowed to bring an
action for conversion. Conversion, the "intentional exercise of dominion or
control" over the property of another, is a tort that "so seriously interferes"
with the interests of the rightful owner that the tortfeasor is forced to pay the
full value of the property.60 In this case, if Moore would have been entitled to
52. Id at 485.
53. Id. at 481.
54. Id. at 493.
55. Id. at 494.
56. Id. at 487, 497.
57. Id. at 501 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 502.
59. Id.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965).
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the full value of his cells through an action for conversion, his recovery would
have been considerably greater than that receivable through breach of
informed consent because the estimated worth of the completed cell line that
came from his cells was more than three billion dollars."
The decision in Moore, including a concurring opinion, a dissenting
opinion, and one opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part, did not
help to clarify the issue of property interests in body parts.62 The majority
opinion in Moore was "ambiguous enough to suggest that a future plaintiff
could bring and sustain a conversion action" if the party could make a better
policy argument in favor of personal autonomy,6 3 and many jurisdictions lack
any law on point. It is thus still unclear whether an individual has a property
interest in his own body, whether that property interest depends upon
competing social policies, and what the limitations on that property interest
might be. The Moore case is often cited to support the proposition that a
patient does not retain property interests in his cells, organs, or tissues once
they have been removed from his body,' but the validity of that stance is
altogether unclear.
Despite that dozens of cases involving similar invasions of a person's bodily
integrity rely on the holding in Moore," the case does not give a clear
explanation of why property interests cannot be recognized in body parts. The
court merely states that property interests in body parts have not been and are
not recognized.66 It is high time that the courts let go of the outdated "no
property rule" in favor of a judicial approach that promotes protection of both
the corporeal self and personal autonomy.
3. Cases Recognizing a Property Interest in the Organs ofLoved Ones
Another case involving the unauthorized use of organs resulted in a much
different classification of the rights that were violated. After her husband's
death, a woman in Ohio declined to make an "anatomical gift" of her
husband's organs. But after the coroner performed an autopsy on the
61. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482.
62. Bray, supra note 28, at 234.
63. Id. at 238.
64. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1074-75 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 996 (2006).
65. E.g., Miles, Inc. v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (S.D.
Cal. 1993); Suthers v. Amgen, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 416,428 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); United States
v. Arora, 860 F. Supp. 1091, 1098 (D. Md. 1994).
66. Moore, 793 P.2d at 492.




husband's body, he allowed a representative from an eye bank to remove the
husband's corneas for use in transplantation." The wife brought a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she was wrongfully deprived of property
without due process.6 9 To the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, it was clear that
the wife had been deprived of a property interest in her husband's body,
regardless of how the state of Ohio wished to classify the interest.70 The court
held that, under Ohio law, the wife had a possessory right in her husband's
body and a right to control its disposal." These types of interests - the right
to possession and the right of disposal - are property rights, regardless of how
the state attempts to classify them.
Opponents of recognizing property rights in the human body would argue
that acknowledging these rights leads to the "commodification" of the human
body. There is fear that some individuals will enter into commercial
arrangements that are. against both public policy and the individual's health.
A civilized society would not agree to subject human tissues to
commercialization. But a property right would not necessarily create a right
to convey that property for compensation.72 All property rights are subject to
legal limitations, and property rights in the human body and its genetic
material could contemplate restrictions on compensated alienation. The fears
of "commodification" and exploitation have not manifested themselves. There
has not been a flood of relatives attempting to sell the corneas of their
deceased kin to the highest bidder. Instead, the recognition of property rights
has only allowed grieving family members to have control over the disposition
of the bodies of their loved ones and to bring claims against those who
interfere.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 478-79.
70. Id. at 482.
71. Id. A similar case in Michigan was decided in favor of affording next-of-kin property
rights in the body of a loved one. Whaley v. Cnty. of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1113, 1116 (6th
Cir. 1995) (noting that "next of kin have the right to dispose of the body in limited
circumstances, possess the body for burial, and prevent its mutilation," and holding that there
are "constitutionally protected property interests in the dead body of a relative").
72. Restrictions on trust land provide an apt example. Indians are unable to alienate trust
land for compensation, despite that they retain other rights therein. "[T]he discovery doctrine
... limit[ed] tribal ownership to use and occupancy [by taking] fee title and corollary rights to
transfer." Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land
Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REv. 595, 650-51 (2000). This bar to compensated alienation,
however, does not create a similar bar to the maintenance of some enforceable property rights
in trust property, including use, enjoyment, possession, and exclusion.
No. 2] 739
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C. Property Interests in Blood
Blood is frequently donated to medical institutions and sometimes sold to
blood banks. Because blood is easy to remove and is naturally replenished by
the body, blood is more likely than other human tissues or fluids to be the
subject of a commercial agreement." Although there is a split in judicial
opinion as to whether commercial sale of one's blood is better classified as the
sale of a product or the rendering of a service,74 both viewpoints support the
proposition that an individual has legitimate (though sometimes functionally
unrecognized) property interests in her blood.
1. Blood is a Taxable Commodity
In a 1979 case, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) argued before the Fifth
Circuit that Dorothy Garber owed taxes on income derived from the sale of her
blood plasma.7 ' Garber's "blood contained a rare antibody" - at the time, "she
was one of only two or three people in the world" whose blood contained
usable amounts of the medically valuable antibody.76 Garber had received
annual payments of approximately $80,000 for her plasma, but she did not pay
federal income tax on these payments. To require income tax payments,
income must be derived from "compensation for services" or from "gains
derived from dealings in property."7 The court did not determine whether the
money Garber received for her blood was better classified as a service or as
property, noting that it was an unsettled area in the law.79 The Fifth Circuit
remanded the case, noting that blood plasma is "like any salable part of the
human body" and can be classified as "tangible property."so
Because Garber was allowed to sell her blood plasma, and was required to
pay taxes on the income she received therefrom, she had some kind of property
interest in her bodily fluids. Garber is in possession of her blood while it is
contained within her body, and she has the right to determine when and how
she will dispose of it. Garber can exclude some medical facilities from taking
her blood, and allow other facilities access to her medically valuable
antibodies. Of chief importance to the IRS, Garber is able to enjoy the profits
73. Hardiman, supra note 9, at 219.
74. Id. at 220.
75. United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1979).
76. Id. at 93-94.
77. Id. at 94 n.1.
78. Id. at 95; I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006).





of her blood. Garber is able to exchange her blood - a fluid that is a product
of her body - for valuable consideration. Possession, use, disposition,
exclusion, and enjoyment are all property rights, and because Garber has these
rights, her interests in her blood should qualify as property rights.
2. Genetic Privacy Can Only Be Protected by Property Rights
In Doe v. High-Tech Institute, Inc., 8 a group of students consented to blood
tests for rubella.82 Without his permission, one particular student's blood
sample was also tested for HIV.8' Because the test results were positive, the
laboratory sent notification to both the school that the individual attended and
the Colorado Department of Health.' The court conceded that an individual
has a general privacy interest in his own body and in any information about his
health." It held that individuals have "recognizable privacy interest[s]" in
their own blood and "the medical information that may be derived"
therefrom."
The court recognized the exceptionally personal nature of having one's
blood sample mishandled by unauthorized testing. It held that any "additional,
unauthorized test . .. can be sufficient to state a claim for relief for intrusion
upon seclusion."8 1 While the student was able to bring this type of privacy
claim, his rights would be better served through the recognition of property
rights in his blood. A successful action for conversion creates a remedy that
is equivalent to a forced sale of the property in question. Unlike a claim that
would only compensate the student for the harm done to his privacy,89 a
conversion claim would require the responsible party to compensate the victim
for the full value of his genetic information. 90 Such a steep remedy for victims
of unauthorized testing would create a strong financial incentive for research
facilities to obtain informed consent before performing any type of testing on
an individual's bodily materials. In Doe, the Colorado court recognized the
importance of maintaining privacy in blood samples, but did no more to
81. 972 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App. 1998).
82. Id. at 1064.
8 3. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1068 (citing Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th
Cir. 1998)).
86. Id. at 1069.
87. Id. at 1068.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965).
89. Id. § 652B.
90. Id. § 222A.
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protect individuals. To afford an action in conversion, there would be no need
to change the current law, but only to apply it differently.
In a similar case in the Ninth Circuit, employees of a federal agency were
instructed to give blood and urine samples as part of a pre-employment health
screening. These samples, unbeknownst to the future employees, were tested
for conditions such as syphilis, sickle-cell anemia, and pregnancy.9' When the
employees learned that their fluid samples had been tested for these medical
conditions without their knowledge or consent, they brought claims against the
laboratory, asserting that their constitutional rights to privacy had been
violated.92 The circuit court found that "[t]he constitutionally protected
privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters clearly encompasses
medical information and its confidentiality."93  The court found that the
"performance of unauthorized tests" on an employee's blood or urine samples
was the "most basic violation [of privacy] possible."94 The court further
articulated its concern for bodily privacy when it noted that there are "few
subject areas more personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests than
that of one's health or genetic make-up."95
If the employees in Nornan-Bloodsaw were able to sue the laboratory for
conversion, their potential remedies would be much higher. The remedy for
conversion requires that the wrongdoer pay the full value of the property that
was wrongfully interfered with,96 awarding the victims the full value of their
blood samples and all the genetic information contained therein. Most people,
and most jurors, probably feel very strongly about the inherent, personal value
of their own genetic information, and would determine the full value of the
blood or tissue samples and genetic information to be fairly high. The forced
sale of victims' genetic information thus would doubtless cost a laboratory
significantly more than recovery through intrusion upon seclusion or some
other privacy-based tort.
Because of the risk of higher judgments against them for unauthorized
testing, laboratories and other facilities that collect and test tissue and fluid
samples would be more careful to ensure that they obtain appropriate informed
consent. Both Doe and Norman-Bloodsaw illustrate that courts possess high
91. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir. 1998).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1269.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965).
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regard for the right to privacy and autonomy. To better protect these rights,
courts should recognize every person's property interest in his own blood.
D. Property Interests in Reproductive Materials
If there is a part of our bodies and genetics that we guard more fiercely than
the rest, it is certainly our capacity to reproduce. This function of the human
body, the capacity to engender offspring, inspires more emotions than any
other type of bodily material that might fall into the hands of outside parties.
As medical technology progresses and fertility clinics become more popular,
it is commonplace for reproductive materials to be separated from the bodies
of their progenitors, and with much greater frequency. Sperm, ova, and
embryos are often removed from the bodies of donors to facilitate conception
through assisted reproductive technology.
1. Sperm Is Recognized as Property
A court in California held that vials of sperm located at a medical facility
can constitute property and are devisable by will. William Kane stored vials
of sperm at a sperm bank in California before he committed suicide." His will
indicated that he wished the sperm to be transferred to his girlfriend, Deborah
Hecht, in hopes that she would conceive a child with it." William Kane's
adult children from a previous marriage objected to the transfer of their
father's genetic material, and asked for an injunction from the court to have the
sperm destroyed or transferred to their possession." The court found that
Kane had a property interest "to the extent that he had decision making
authority as to the use of his sperm for reproduction."' 00 The court asserted
that Kane's right to make decisions regarding the use and disposition of his
bodily fluid was sufficient to constitute a property right that could be
transferred at death.' 0 ' Because the court recognized Kane's right to transfer
his preserved sperm to his girlfriend, he had an enforceable property interest
in it.
A Louisiana court similarly found sperm to constitute property and be
transferable during life, just as one would give an inter vivos gift of any other
97. Hecht v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (1993) (directing superior court to vacate
order to destroy stored vials of sperm).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 279.
100. Id. at 283.
101. Id
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type of property.10 Hall was diagnosed with cancer and decided to store
samples of his sperm before undergoing chemotherapy treatment.10 3  He
executed a document that purported to convey the stored sperm to his
girlfriend in hopes that she would later conceive his child.'" Hall died, and his
next-of-kin attempted to block the transfer of the sperm samples to his
girlfriend. 0' The court upheld a preliminary injunction that prevented Hall's
girlfriend from using the sperm until there was a trial on the merits of Hall's
competency, but it did note that sperm can be property and can be the subject
of conveyance in the same manner as any other property.'
Collectively, these cases indicate that at least some courts recognize that
sperm can constitute property and is transferable. Because sperm is
transferable, its donor has a property right in it before the transfer occurs.
Because a man has the right to dispose of his sperm by donating it to a fertility
clinic or to a partner, he has a property interest in this reproductive material
that should be protected under the law as such.
2. Frozen Embryos
Some couples attempting to conceive children with the assistance of a
fertility clinic undergo in vitro fertilization. During in vitro fertilization,
medical professionals retrieve multiple eggs from a woman's ovaries.' Some
of these ova are fertilized and placed in a woman's uterus in the hopes that a
child will result, and any additional eggs that are retrieved from the mother are
fertilized and frozen so that she may try to conceive at a later time.' Once an
egg has been fertilized, it is a pre-embryo.'09 Courts have held that pre-
embryos are neither persons nor property, but have characteristics of both." 0
The Supreme Court of Tennessee described pre-embryos as "occupy[ing] an
102. Hall v. Fertility Inst. of New Orleans, 647 So.2d 1348, 1351 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
103. Id. at 1349-50.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1351-52.
107. I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and
Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVFDecrease Adoption Rates and Should It Matter?, 95 MINN. L.
REv. 485, 491 (2010).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. E.g., Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 742 (E.D. Va. 1998);
Hecht v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275,281 (1993); In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844, 849




interim category" between person and property "that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life."'"
Despite that these pre-embryos are made from the reproductive tissues of
individuals, and that individuals have property rights in their reproductive
tissue, courts do not classify pre-embryos as property because they have the
potential, if properly implanted into a female body, to blossom into human
life." 2 It is only this reverence for potential life that inhibits courts from
declaring that couples have full property rights in their pre-embryos."'
Genetic parents of frozen embryos have been described as having "an interest
in the nature of ownership" in the embryos, but not an ownership interest
itself."4 Perhaps this is yet another example of courts conflating normative
conceptions of "ownership" with property rights, but the interests are
nonetheless unrecognized.
To best protect individuals and their genetic information, it is important that
courts recognize the property interests that people have in their own bodies.
Holding recognized property interests in one's own reproductive materials
allows an individual to bring a claim for conversion when another severely
interferes with his rights therein, affording a remedy equivalent to that of a
forced sale for the value of the infringed-upon interest. Allowing conversion
claims for reproductive materials would not be a modification of the law of
conversion, but mere recognition of legal rights that every individual already
possesses. For example, all people enjoy the profits of their manual labor, and
all people are free to make provisions for the disposition of their bodies after
death. Because we enjoy these rights in our own bodies, we have functional
property interests therein. To protect these interests and allow people to bring
claims to defend them, courts must recognize that every individual has
property rights in her body, her body parts, her bodily fluids, and her genetic
information.
III. Religious and Cultural Privacy of the Tribes
Because of the personal nature of medical information that can be
ascertained from human tissue samples, property rights in body parts should
be recognized to protect every individual's right to privacy and autonomy.
Individuals and their next-of-kin are not usually in a position to dispute with
111. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (reviewing case where divorcing
couple cannot agree upon the disposition of their frozen embryo held at a fertility clinic).
112. Cohen & Chen, supra note 107, at 491.
113. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
114. Id.
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the staff of a research laboratory or medical institute that is using genetic
materials inappropriately. Without the legal recognition and protection of
property rights, individuals and their next-of-kin have few fruitful causes of
action to bring against researchers and other professionals who misuse genetic
information.
While the recognition of property rights in an individual's body is important
for everyone, there are some groups that have an even greater need to protect
their genetic information. As smaller groups of peoples that have often been
overrun by the majority, Native American tribes have more compelling reasons
to carefully guard their genetic information. Tribes, like others, have very
little power to pursue claims against researchers that use their genetic
information in ways of which the tribe would not approve. To survive as
distinct nations, today's tribes work to preserve their cultural and religious
privacy. To legitimately protect these privacies, it is essential that tribes and
tribal members are afforded property rights in their genetic information.
Tribes have more reason to be wary of researchers who might violate their
trust. As a small population of people with unique genetic characteristics, their
genetic information is more heavily sought after than the genetic information
of other members of society. Tribes have more reason to be fearful of
unauthorized genetic research because the results can be very stigmatizing and
damaging to their reputation as an ethnic group. Moreover, when scientists do
research on genetic information harvested from tribal members, the results of
the research are often misconstrued as representing findings enveloping the
entire tribe.'"
A. Historical Overview of Congressional Support for Native American
Religion and Culture
Despite that the United States was founded on principles of religious
freedom," 6 the treatment of Native American religious practices has not
always been consistent with these ideals."' For a long period in American
history, the federal government pursued an assimilationist policy toward
115. For example, blood samples were taken from only two hundred members of the
Havasupai tribe. Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1067 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2008). Genetic information extracted from these blood samples was used to support
propositions that the Havasupai people, as a whole, were predisposed to certain diseases. See
id. at 1066-67.
116. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
117. James R. Dalton, Comment, There Is Nothing Light About Feathers: Finding Form in




Native American religion and culture."' During the late 1800s, the federal
government discouraged the practice of Indian religion by overt legislation that
outlawed Indian funeral ceremonies and other religious ceremonies, such as
the Sun Dance." 9 Congress also supported sectarian boarding schools for
Native American children.120  These schools were far removed from the
children's homes and families, in an attempt to isolate the children from Indian
influences and assimilate them into white culture.121 While the children
attended school, they were banned from using any Indian language, custom,
or religious practice.122
Beginning with the Meriam Report in 1928, the federal government
changed its attitude toward Indian religion and culture.123 The Meriam Report
criticized the actions of the government in suppressing Indian religions and
suggested a more tolerant approach.12 4 Congressional actions over the past
several decades have shown a greater concern with preserving and protecting
Native American culture and religion.125
B. American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Congress enacted the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) to
protect the religious freedom of the Indian tribes.126 While the AIRFA does
not give an individual tribal member a cause of action or any "judicially
enforceable rights," 27 it specifically enumerates the federal government's
policy toward the right of Native Americans to "believe, express, and exercise
the traditional religions."' 28 Congress passed this legislation to articulate the
federal government's policy toward Native American religious practices and
118. Louis Fisher, Indian Religious Freedom: To Litigate or Legislate?, 26 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 1, 8 (2001-2002).
119. Id. The Sun Dance was banned in 1881. Id. Federal officials outlawed the Sun Dance
because many thought it was "connected with Indian militancy." United States v. Friday, 525
F.3d 938, 942 (10th Cir. 2008).
'120. Fisher, supra note 118, at 8.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 10.
124. Id.
125. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
127. Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1488 (D. Ariz. 1990) (quoting
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988)).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
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to set the standard for federal agencies by requiring that they act with respect
for the religious rights of Native American tribes.129
The AIRFA requires a federal agency to evaluate its policies and procedures
with the aim of protecting Indian religious freedom, refraining from
prohibiting access, possession, and use of religious objects and the
performance of religious ceremonies, and consulting with Indian organizations
in regard to the proposed action.130
Although Native Americans do not have judicially enforceable rights under
the AIRFA, the Act is often used to support policy arguments in favor of other
legislation passed to support Native American religious freedom. In a case
involving exceptions to the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa cited the AIRFA,
writing that "[i]t is the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian."'
If the federal government wishes to continue to protect the rights of Native
Americans to practice their religious customs, it is essential that the courts
recognize the property interests that Native American tribes and tribal
members have in their bodies, body parts, and genetic information. Medical
research, such as the unauthorized genetic research on Havasupai blood
samples, is not only damaging to the privacy of the individuals involved, but
also to the religious privacy of the whole tribe. Because publication of the
results of genetic research can be in direct conflict with traditional religious
beliefs of many tribes, tribes need enforceable property interests in the genetic
information of their members to protect the tribe from intrusions into the
tribe's cultural and religious privacy. With property interests in their genetic
information, tribes can bring causes of action based on conversion instead of
privacy. The remedy for a conversion is a forced sale of the property in
question.13 When the converted property is the genetic information of an
entire tribe, an entire people, the damages will be much greater than the same
injury brought under a claim based on privacy. If tribes are able to bring
conversion claims and seek higher judgments against those who
misappropriate their genetic information, researchers will be more careful to
obtain informed consent in the future.
129. Havasupai Tribe, 752 F. Supp. at 1488.
130. Id.
131. United States v. Oliver, No. CR99-0010, 2000 WL 34030990, *5 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 9,
2000), af'id, 255 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 2001).




C. Exceptions to the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
Congress has an ongoing relationship with the tribes and strives to pass
legislation in their best interests.133 In 1940, Congress passed the Bald Eagle
Protection Act to shield the dwindling American population of bald eagles
from extinction.134 Golden eagles were not protected under the original
language of the Act, but in 1962, the Act was amended to include protections
for the golden eagle as well. 35 The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
(BGEPA) provides for both civil and criminal penalties. In its current form,
the BGEPA allows a maximum fine of $5,000 and imprisonment of up to one
year for the first violation, and a maximum fine of $10,000 and imprisonment
of up to two years for each subsequent violation.3 6
The bald eagle has cultural significance to most Americans because it is the
symbol of both the United States and its government."' The eagle's symbolic
importance, however, is not limited to the government of the United States.
Eagles play a significant part in the religious and spiritual practices of many
tribes, and body parts of eagles are such important religious symbols that they
have been likened to the Christian cross.33 The eagle is seen as a holy
"messenger" that is connected with the Creator.1' For this reason, Native
Americans often view eagle parts as essential elements to communicate with
the spirit world.'4 0 One ceremony that requires the use of an eagle is the Sun
Dance.'4 ' Many tribes perform this weeklong ceremony, and the tail fan of an
eagle must be offered as part of the dance.'4 2 Because the eagle has
significance to the cultural and religious practices of many different tribes, any
limitation on the hunting of eagles or the use of eagle parts creates limitations
on Native American religious practices.
133. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 418-19 (Nell Jessup Newton et al.
eds., LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN].
134. Dalton, supra note 117, at 1589; Roberto Iraola, The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection
Act, 68 ALB. L. REv. 973, 974 (2005).
135. Dalton, supra note 117, at 1589; Iraola, supra note 134, at 973.
136. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2006); Iraola, supra note 134, at 975-76.
137. Dalton, supra note 117, at 1587-88.
138. Id. at 1586-87 (quoting United States v. Thirty-Eight Golden Eagles or Eagle Parts, 649
F. Supp. 269, 276 (D. Nev. 1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1987)).
139. Id. at 1587.
140. Id.
141. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 942 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
142. Id.
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Because of the federal government's special relationship with the Indian
tribes'43 and its concern with protecting their cultural and religious freedom,
Congress made special allowances for tribal members when it passed the
BGEPA.'44 Recognizing the importance of the eagle in Native American
religious practices, the BGEPA codifies an exception for Native Americans
who wish to use eagles or eagle parts for religious purposes.'4 5 Any member
of a federally recognized tribe may submit an application to the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service to receive eagle bodies or eagle parts.' 46 The Fish
and Wildlife Service established the National Eagle Repository, which stores
and distributes eagle bodies and eagle parts to approved applicants.147 By
making special provisions for Native American use of eagle bodies and eagle
parts, Congress has reaffirmed that protecting Native American culture and
religion continues to be an important goal of federal Indian policy.
Many tribal religious ceremonies that use eagle parts or eagle bodies can
only be performed with pure specimens. 14 This means that the eagle or eagle
part used in the ceremony cannot be reused from year to year, and the eagle
"cannot have died through poison, disease or electrocution, and it cannot be
roadkill."' 49 Unfortunately, most of the eagle bodies and eagle parts held in
the Repository are those that are found as victims of roadkill or by
electrocution on power lines.' Eagles that died when struck by automobiles
or shocked by power lines are not pure enough for some religious ceremonies.
For situations where an eagle from the Repository would be unfit for the
ceremonial purposes of the tribe, the Secretary of the Interior may give
permission to an individual to take an eagle from the wild."' A tribal member
may write to the Migratory Bird Permit Office to obtain a permit to take an
eagle from the wild. The tribal member must explain why an eagle from the
Repository does not meet the requirements for the ceremony, which species of
143. The relationship between Congress and the Indian tribes has been described as a
relationship between a guardian and a ward. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384
(1886). Generally, Congress is presumed to act in the best interest of the tribes. Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).
144. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2006); see also Dalton, supra note 117, at 1611.
145. Iraola, supra note 134, at 973 & n.4.
146. Id. at 979.
147. Id. at 979-80.
148. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 943 (10th Cir. 2008).
149. Id.





eagle is needed, and how many eagles the tribal member wishes to take.'52 if
the use of eagles would not adversely impact the preservation of the overall
eagle population, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to issue permits to
Native Americans to allow them to hunt and take eagle specimens from the
wild.'
This exception to the prohibition on hunting eagles is evidence of
Congress's intent to carefully guard the religious and cultural rights of the
tribes. Despite that eagles are endangered species protected by law,
Congress's concerns about the cultural and religious freedom of the tribes
override this critical legislation. Because Congress is willing to make
exceptions to legislation that protects the bald eagle - the most symbolic and
revered animal in the nation - courts should recognize that protecting the
cultural and religious freedom of Native Americans is an imperative aim.
Because exceptions can be made to legislation protecting endangered species,
exceptions can be made to traditional property laws - especially when such
exceptions do not truly alter the status of the law, but merely the
characterizations thereof.
D. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
In another legislative move that shows high regard for Native American
cultural and religious privacy, Congress passed the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). ' The NAGPRA protects Native
American "human remains," "funerary objects," and "objects of cultural
patrimony."' 5 Items of cultural patrimony include any objects that have
ongoing significance to the Native American group.' The significance of an
object of cultural patrimony can derive from "historical, traditional, or cultural
importance.""
The NAGPRA requires that every federal agency and museum that
possesses Native American human remains or funerary objects create an
inventory of the items." These provisions of the NAGPRA apply to all
152. Id. at 944-45.
153. Id. at 944; 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2011); Iraola, supra note 134,
at 973 & n.4.
154. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006); see also Michelle Hibbert, Comment, Galileos or
Grave Robbers? Science, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and
the First Amendment, 23 AM. INDiAN L. REv. 425, 456-57 (1998-1999).
155. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2006).
156. COHEN, supra note 133, at 1236.
157. Id.
158. 25 U.S.C. § 3003 (2006).
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federal agencies that hold Native American remains or cultural objects and
museums that are funded by the federal government, including institutions of
higher learning.' 9 The inventories must be created in cooperation with Indian
tribal governments and religious leaders,160 and are created for the purpose of
notifying interested tribes that federal agencies or museums have possession
of Native American remains and cultural objects.' 6 ' Armed with this
knowledge, the tribe may then request that the Native American human
remains and funerary objects be returned to them.16 2
Congress found Native American cultural objects important enough to
warrant protection and repatriation under the NAGPRA, but also important
enough to justify implementing legislation that makes the use or profit from
these cultural items a federal crime. The Act itself provides civil penalties for
failure of any museum or agency to comply with its provisions.'63 A provision
was also adopted to make trafficking of Native American human remains or
cultural items a crime under the United States Code." Any individual that
knowingly buys, sells, or uses any of the cultural items or remains outlined in
the NAGPRA is subject both to fines and up to one year's imprisonment."5
Both the NAGPRA and criminal provisions of the United States Code
underscore the seriousness with which Congress views the religious and
cultural rights of Native American peoples.
The legislative history of the NAGPRA reveals that Congress is concerned
with treating Indian remains with dignity and allowing tribes possessory rights
over human remains and cultural objects associated with their tribes.'66 The
NAGPRA recognizes that tribes have some type of property or quasi-property
rights in the remains of their ancestors." This right to possession includes the
right to decide how and where human remains should be interred and what
should be done with the objects of cultural value.'16 This right of possession
in the remains of ancestors is a property right.
159. COHEN, supra note 133, at 1236.
160. 25 U.S.C. § 3003(b)(1)(A).
161. Id § 3003(d).
162. Id § 3005(a)(1).
163. Id. § 3007(a).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2006).
165. Id.
166. Hibbert, supra note 154, at 430.
167. Id. at 453.
168. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a).
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E. The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990
Yet another piece of federal legislation enacted to protect the cultural and
religious privacy of the tribes is the Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA). The
IACA was enacted to protect Indian art and Indian cultural privacy.16 9 It
prevents the sale of goods that are falsely represented to be Indian-made.'
The Act is intended to clear the market of false Indian art to ensure that tribes
can better profit from the creation and sale of their art."' Essentially, it affords
an intangible property right in Native American cultural privacy, one of the
elements that many people believe essential to the long-term survival of the
tribes.
In an article on tribal cultural sovereignty, Rebecca Tsosie writes, "Cultural
resources, both tangible and intangible, are of critical importance to Native
peoples, because Native culture is essential to the survival of Indian Nations
as distinctive cultural and political groups."'72 Some aspects of Native
American culture, such as religious customs, eagles, or artwork, are so
important to tribes that Congress has passed federal legislation directly
addressing them.
The passage of the AIRFA, the BGEPA, the NAGPRA, and the IACA
shows that, in at least some instances, Congress honors its obligation to protect
tribal interests, including the rights of cultural and religious freedom, by
affording property rights or quasi-property rights to tribes and their members
in a variety of circumstances. If Congress's intention is to protect the cultural
viability of the tribes, extending the protections of property law to Native
American genetic information can only help to further the policy of defending
Native American culture and religion. With the protections of legal claims
based on property law, Native American tribes could better ensure that their
cultural and religious privacy would be respected. Remedies for property-
based claims like conversion are very powerful tools in the hands of the tribes.
If Native American tribes were permitted to bring suit based on their property
rights in their own bodies, medical and research facilities would be
economically compelled to obtain informed consent before each and every
instance of using Native American genetic information for research. In this
way, tribes could closely monitor research practices to determine whether
169. COHEN, supra note 133, at 1264.
170. Id. at 1263.
171. Id. at 1263-64.
172. Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and
Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 300 (2002).
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tribal cultural and religious beliefs are being respected throughout the research
process. If the genetic information of tribal members is thereafter treated in
a way that is not in accord with tribal beliefs, tribes could then turn to property
claims to seek restoration.
IV. The Havasupai and Tribal Property Interests in Genetic Information
The Havasupai Tribe of Arizona is principally located in Supai Village, at
the bottom of the Grand Canyon.'13 According to Havasupai religious history,
the tribe has "inhabited the [Grand Canyon] from the beginning" of human
life.174 The Havasupai believe that the Grand Canyon is "the birthplace of the
human race," and that they are entrusted with the sacred duty of protecting the
canyon where they live today."' Like many other Native American tribes, the
Havasupai have a strong cultural and spiritual connection to their environment.
When a disproportionate number of tribal members started to develop
diabetes in the 1980s, the Havasupai turned to a trusted friend for guidance.' 76
John Martin, a professor of anthropology at Arizona State University (ASU),
had studied the tribe for years and had cultivated a friendship with the
Havasupai.'" A member of the tribe approached Martin, asking him whether
there was anything that could be done to research the high rate of diabetes
among the Havasupai.'s Martin contacted another professor at ASU, Dr.
Therese Markow, because of her expertise in genetics. 79 Dr. Markow agreed
to help with the diabetes research, but wanted to conduct additional research
on schizophrenia in the Havasupai population.'" Martin told Markow that the
Havasupai were only interested in diabetes research.'s
Between 1990 and 1992, blood samples were taken from more than two
hundred members of the Havasupai tribe.182 The diabetes research proved
inconclusive, but researchers from both ASU and the University of Arizona
continued to use the Havasupai blood samples for other research projects on
173. SUPAI VILLEGE IN HAVASUPAI, http://www.havasupaitribe.com/village.html (last visited
Apr. 25, 2011); Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2008).
174. Wolf, supra note 1, at 119.
175. Id.
176. Id.




181. Id. at 1066-67.
182. Id. at 1067.
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evolutionary genetics, schizophrenia, and inbreeding.18 Dr. Markow had
applied for a research grant to study the genetics of schizophrenia among the
Havasupai without the knowledge of Dr. Martin or the Havasupai.18 4 This
grant was later approved.' In 2002, Martin discovered that research was still
being conducted on the Havasupai blood samples, but not for diabetes. He
informed the Havasupai Tribal Council of his concerns.' The Havasupai
contacted ASU to get information on the whereabouts of the blood samples
and the research being conducted.'
In 2003, a doctoral student at ASU presented research performed on
Havasupai blood samples. This research was not related to the study of
diabetes.' The most harmful part of this research centered on migratory
genetics. The results of this study, indicating that the Havasupai descend from
people who migrated from Asia to North America, were in direct conflict with
traditional Havasupai beliefs.'89 The Havasupai tribe esteem themselves to be
the "traditional guardians of the Grand Canyon," entrusted with the duty to
protect the birthplace of humanity.'90 Because the Havasupai believe that their
origins lie within the Grand Canyon, research performed with Havasupai blood
samples indicating that the tribe descends from Asia is deeply harmful to
Havasupai cultural and spiritual identity. Not only did ASU researchers
violate the trust of the Havasupai and the bounds of the diabetes research
project, but they threatened Havasupai cultural and religious privacy in the
process.
On May 9, 2003, the Havasupai issued a banishment order against ASU, its
professors, and its employees. '' The terms of the research agreement between
ASU and the Havasupai had been violated, and the tribe had suffered cultural,
religious, and personal harm. ASU and the Havasupai agreed to allow an
independent investigator to examine what kinds of research had been
performed on the Havasupai blood samples and the current whereabouts of the
samples.192  During the investigation, the independent body found that
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samples would be used to study schizophrenia."' The investigation also
revealed that Dr. Markow might have instructed a staff member to search
through tribal medical records during the night, when the tribal clinic was
closed, to look for evidence of schizophrenia in the community.1 94
The Court of Appeals of Arizona reversed the judgment of the superior
court and remanded the case because the superior court erred in granting
summary judgment to the defendants.'95 The court found that the notices of
claim contained enough information to show that the tribal members' rights
had been violated by ASU's research practices.'96 Because there were enough
facts supporting the settlement demands in the notices of claim, summary
judgment in favor of the defendants was improper.' 97 Before the case went to
trial for a second time, the parties agreed to an out-of-court settlement.198
Plaintiffs in the case did not bring property-related claims against the
Arizona Board of Regents, Dr. Markow, or any other defendants because
existing case law does not recognize property interests in one's blood. But
because of the nature of the cultural and religious privacy interests violated,
the most equitable remedy available to the tribe would require the court to
recognize a property interest in this case and in similar cases in the future. If
the Havasupai tribe had been allowed to bring a property-based claim such as
conversion, its recovery for the harm done to its religious privacy doubtless
would have been greater. This largerjudgment or settlement would have stood
as a warning to all research facilities using Native American genetic materials,
and would give these facilities a strong economic incentive to work with the
tribes in conformity with tribal beliefs.
V. Conversion Best Protects the Cultural and Religious Privacy ofNative
American Tribes
Nothing could be more harmful to a tribe than genetic research that
dispositively denies the tribe's account of its history. The notice-of-claim
letter from the Havasupai to the Arizona Board of Regents states that "ASU's
actions have invaded the personal privacy of Havasupai tribal members and
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Havasupai Tribe, 204 P.3d at 1075.
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the cultural and religious privacy of the Havasupai Tribe."'" By using
Havasupai blood samples to show that the Havasupai are likely descended
from Asia, researchers have turned the Havasupai tribe's genetic materials
against its own cultural and religious teachings.
Tribal members should be granted enforceable property rights in their
bodies and genetic information so that they may safeguard their unique genetic
makeup. Just as federal legislation such as the NAGPRA grants tribes
property interests in the remains of their ancestors, tribes and individual tribal
members should similarly have property rights in their own bodies. Scholars
generally have made arguments in favor of two types of legal protections that
are already available to tribes: tort law and quasi-property law. But both tort
claims and quasi-property claims are insufficient to adequately protect the
information contained within the genetic makeup of tribal members.
A. Privacy Tort Claims Are Insufficient to Protect Tribal Genetic Privacy
While many would agree that respect for tribal religious privacy is a
legitimate goal, some would argue that current tort law is sufficient to protect
tribes and to compensate them for harms that occur. There are tort claims for
invasion of privacy, including unreasonable public disclosure of private
information and intrusion upon seclusion.200
To bring a claim for invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private
facts, the plaintiff must show that the fact disclosed was private, that it was
disclosed to the public, that the disclosure was one that would be considered
highly offensive to a reasonable person, that the fact was not an issue of public
concern, and that the person disclosing did so with reckless disregard for the
privacy of the wronged individual.2 0' The problem with using this tort for
invasions of Native American genetic privacy is that it fails to take into
account any of the cultural or religious harm that a tribe or tribal member will
incur when the private facts are disclosed to the public. For most plaintiffs
with claims of public disclosure of private facts, the harm suffered is a
personal harm to their reputation and privacy. By contrast, the harm to a tribal
member whose private genetic information has been disseminated to the public
will affect not only the individual member's privacy, but also his spiritual and
cultural privacy and the religious and cultural privacy of the entire tribe. As
seen in the Havasupai case, dissemination to the public of private genetic
199. Havasupai Tribe, 204 P.3d at 1068.
200. Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1064-65 (Colo. App. 1998).
201. Id. at 1065.
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information hurt the entire tribe's religious privacy because the findings were
in direct opposition to the religious beliefs of the Havasupai tribe.
An additional difficulty with using this tort claim is the proof problems that
a tribal member will face in trying to establish that the disclosure was highly
offensive to the reasonable person. While it is clear that the reasonable person
would be offended by unauthorized testing of his genetic material, it is not
clear that the reasonable person would be deeply offended for religious
reasons. Because the reasonable person, and the average juror, is unlikely to
understand that Native American religion is deeply pervasive in every aspect
of daily life,202 the reasonable person may not find the violation of religious
privacy to be highly offensive. Because tort claims are judged in accordance
with the reasonable person standard, tort claims fall short of protecting Native
American cultural and religious privacy.
Another type of privacy claim, intrusion upon seclusion, is often brought in
cases involving unauthorized testing.203 Intrusion upon seclusion requires that
someone intentionally intrude upon the solitude of the plaintiff and that the
intrusion be considered offensive to the reasonable person. The same proof
problems exist for this type of tort claim as are found in public disclosure of
private facts. The reasonable person's view of certain types of conduct is not
necessarily compatible with the way that a tribal member would view the very
same conduct. Many tribes place emphasis on community and life as a
205
group, in contrast to the individualistic conceptions of life in western
society. This difference may make the harm to Native Americans unlike the
harm to non-Indians. Intrusion upon the seclusion of a tribal member's genetic
history is not just an intrusion upon the individual, but an intrusion upon the
entire tribe's religious privacy and life-way.
Tort claims protecting privacy are based on the harm that a reasonable
person would suffer. Because the reasonable person's conception of what
constitutes offensive conduct may be fundamentally different than the
reasonable Native American person's, tort claims are insufficient to protect
tribes. To illustrate, consider two cases in which researchers exceed the scope
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).
203. E.g., Doe, 972 P.2d at 1065.
204. Id.
205. Before the introduction of European influences, most Native American tribes were
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citizens." COHEN, supra note 133, at 250. These kinship groups formed the basic building
blocks of Native American society. Political power was associated with the community at
large, rather than with a particular individual, and the goal of political action was the promotion
of harmony with the group. Id.
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of their proposed study by performing unauthorized genetic testing on blood
samples and publishing the results. In one case, the individual is not a member
of any federally recognized Indian tribe. She can bring claims based on the
violation of her privacy, including intrusion upon seclusion and public
disclosure of private facts. Her case would be heard by a jury, who would
determine the measure of her damages. The jury will consider how this
woman was injured by the unauthorized genetic testing, and will consider
whether a reasonable person would be offended by this type of privacy
violation. Her damages will be based on the harm that the reasonable person
would have suffered.
In a second case, the individual is a member of a Native American tribe.
Her genetic privacy was violated in exactly the same manner as the woman
who was not a tribal member, but the harms she suffers are much different.
Because she is a member of a very small minority group, the results of the
genetic research are labeled as representative of her entire tribe. The published
results disparage the tribe by conflating the unfortunate test results of one with
the likely test results of all others, and are in direct conflict with the tribe's
cultural history. The harm becomes not only individual, but tribal, and to an
egregious degree.
The second woman is also entitled to bring claims based in privacy,
including intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts.
When her case goes before a jury, she will be entitled to exactly the same
kinds of damages as the first woman. A jury will decide her case and will
determine her damages based on the offense that a reasonable person would
have felt. But the reasonable person's view of the injury is not the same as the
reasonable Native American's measure of the harm done. The jury's
determination of damages will include harms that the individual woman has
suffered, but not the visceral harms that the other members of her tribe
doubtless have suffered. Because the harms that the woman suffered were not
only personal injury, but also religious, cultural, and tribal injury, is it truly
just to afford her the same measure of damages as the non-Indian woman?
These differences show the insufficiency of tort claims for violation of
genetic privacy. Despite that these two women were both victims of the same
unauthorized researched, the harms that they suffered are very different, and
the law should account for such differences. Because American culture is
distinct from that of many Native American tribes, it is impossible to
accurately portray the type and depth of damages within the confines of the
reasonable person standard. Because tort claims are unable to account for
religious, cultural, or communal harms, they are insufficient to adequately
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protect the interests of Native American tribes and their members in the case
of unauthorized genetic testing.
B. Quasi-Property Rights and the Right of Commerciality Are Insufficient to
Protect Tribal Genetic Privacy
Quasi-property rights have been championed as the most fair way to protect
an individual's interest in his own body, while simultaneously protecting
society's interest in medical and scientific research.206 A limited property
right, such as the right of commerciality, would allow a person to have
"intangible rights in the commercial potential of his or her own body."207 This
right of commerciality does not give an individual full property rights in his
own body, bodily fluids, and genetic information, but a mere right to the
commercial value of his body.208
While this quasi-property right might be helpful in instances where the
tissues are used for the development of patents and products that have some
commercial value, it would do nothing to protect the cultural and religious
privacy of groups like the Havasupai. A quasi-property right, such as the right
of commerciality, would only protect an individual from being deprived of
profit made using his cells or tissues. To the Havasupai and to many other
groups, money is neither the object of litigation nor a cure for the harm done.
It is important to note that "the right of commerciality would not apply to the
use of human tissue for research; pure, nonprofit research would not be
actionable." 209 While it is essential to prevent any chilling effect on medical
or technological research, even nonprofit research, if done without proper
consent from the donor of the tissue, can be harmful.
Quasi-property causes of action might help some plaintiffs to recover for
their injuries, but would fail to protect other groups deserving of compensation
for harms incurred. The cases of Moore and Havasupai illustrate this point
perfectly. If quasi-property rights were afforded to the plaintiffs from these
cases, they would be permitted to bring a claim for any unauthorized genetic
research resulting in some kind commercial gain. Moore would be able to
recover the value of the cells that were used to develop a cell line worth more
than three billion dollars. 210 Accordingly, it is very likely that his damages will
be quite high. The Havasupai, on the other hand, will have no recognizable
206. See generally Hardiman, supra note 9, at 227-36.
207. Id. at 258.
208. Id. at 261-62.
209. Id. at 262.




cause of action under a quasi-property theory because no product was
produced from the unauthorized genetic research. Despite that the results of
the unauthorized genetic research were made public, creating a multitude of
social, cultural, and religious harms, the Havasupai would have no
compensable harm under a quasi-property cause of action. Because the
research was performed by a university that was unable to create a marketable
product from this genetic research, the Havasupai will recover nothing.
Making the distinction between cases where the unauthorized genetic
research leads to profit and those where it leads to disparaging published
works seems an arbitrary line to draw. The unauthorized research in both
cases was extremely harmful, but one party will be able to recover a large
amount, while the other plaintiffs will recover nothing at all. Recognizing
property rights in genetic materials eliminates the need to draw such arbitrary
lines by providing a cause of action that affords comprehensive relief.
If the courts were to recognize property rights in genetic materials, both
Moore and the Havasupai tribe would be able to seek damages for their
injuries through a claim for conversion. Making a cause of action reliant on
the fortuitous circumstance of research resulting in a profitable product seems
to draw an arbitrary distinction that the law should not tolerate. Recognizing
only quasi-property rights in cells and tissues provides little deterrence to
research facilities performing unauthorized genetic research because there is
no risk ofajudgment against them unless the research results in financial gain.
If, and only if, the research proved profitable would the facility be required to
compensate the plaintiff for the value of his tissues and cells. The risk that
research institutions will continue to perform unauthorized research is too
great to make such a concession.
To protect all types of groups from unauthorized genetic research, the courts
should recognize a cause of action based in property law. Recognizing
enforceable property rights in genetic material gives every individual the right
to sue for the conversion of his genetic information, regardless of whether the
research was profitable for the violating institution.
C. Claims Based on Property Rights Provide the Most Comprehensive
Protection for Individual and Tribal Rights in Genetic Privacy
If tribal members have property rights in their body parts and bodily fluids,
they can exercise control over the use of their genetic information. With
enforceable property rights, tribal members will be able to monitor any
research undertaken and bring claims against those who do not comply with
the wishes of the tribe. They will also be able to bring claims for conversion
against those who perform unauthorized research.
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Conversion is the "unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of
ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the
alteration of their condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights."2 1 1 If
human tissue is recognized as personal property of the individual, then any
unauthorized use of that property could be subject to a claim for conversion.
An action for conversion will stand not only where property has been taken
from the rightful owner, but also in any situation where a person exercises
rights that are inconsistent with the rights of the true owner. For example,
"should the patient seek the return of the tissue, the failure of the physician to
deliver it is an 'exclusion' of the patient's personal property rights," and the
patient would have a claim for conversion.212 In cases like that of the
Havasupai, where researchers perform tests that are beyond the scope of
authorization, researchers should be subject to a claim for conversion because
they have exercised rights over the tissue that are inconsistent with the rights
of the Havasupai to refrain from participating in certain types of medical
studies.
Allowing individuals to sue for conversion of their genetic information
would protect patients by allowing them to sue physicians or researchers who
wrongfully use their genetic information. Unlike privacy causes of action that
fail to take into account religious, cultural, or tribal harms, the remedy for
conversion requires a fact-based analysis of the full value of the property in
question. The remedy for conversion is a forced sale of the property.213
Because the victim of conversion must be given the full value of the property
in question, victims of conversion are better situated than victims of privacy
torts or quasi-property rights. Privacy torts only compensate victims for the
harm that would be suffered by the reasonable person, and quasi-property
recovery depends largely upon whether the unauthorized research resulted in
profit for the institution. Only a claim for conversion would require a research
facility to pay a victim the full value of the genetic information that was
misappropriated.
Whatever the value of the misappropriated genetic information - including
the personal value, the value to the tribe, and the value in protecting religious
and cultural beliefs - would be the value of the material converted. To
compensate victims of unauthorized genetic research, a medical or research
institution subject to an action for conversion would be required to pay victims
211. Hardiman, supra note 9, at 250 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (5th ed.
1979)).
212. Id. at 251.




the full value of the misappropriated genetic information. In a case like that
of the Havasupai, where unauthorized testing was published in contravention
of the most basic religious and cultural precepts of the tribe, the value of that
genetic information would be especially high.
By recognizing individual property rights in genetic information, courts can
make clear to physicians and researchers that they could be held financially
liable for unauthorized research. If researchers and medical professionals are
aware of the onerous economic consequences of converting the genetic
information of another, they will be more careful to obtain informed consent
before conducting research. Raising awareness of consent requirements can
help both research facilities and individual donors because the parties will
have an incentive to engage in an open and honest discussion regarding the
disposition of genetic material before patients choose to donate.
Furthermore, in cases of unauthorized genetic research, it is easier for the
plaintiff to prove the elements of conversion than the elements of a privacy
tort. The plaintiff need only show that he had a possessory interest in
something, that the defendant exercised rights that were inconsistent with the
plaintiffs own property rights, and that resulting harm occurred.2 14 The
plaintiff need not prove that the defendant converted the property with ill
intentions - only that the defendant intended to exercise rights inconsistent
with the rights of the owner.2 15 This is a much lower burden on the plaintiff
than would be required for privacy torts. Privacy torts, such as public
disclosure of private facts, require that the injured party show that the
defendant acted with reckless disregard for the plaintiffs privacy.216 By
instead using conversion and concomitantly lowering the burden of proof with
regard to the mental element, patients and donors will be more likely to prevail
when their genetic information has been used against their will.
Moreover, claims for conversion do not require the harm to be compared to
what is offensive to the reasonable person. Privacy torts require that the
intrusion be offensive to the reasonable person,2 17 but the level of outrage felt
by the reasonable person may not mirror the harm done to a Native American
whose cultural and religious privacy is violated by unauthorized genetic
research. Because Native American customs and religious beliefs are not
something that the "reasonable person" would consider when examining the
214. See id.
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offensiveness of an intrusion, property claims like conversion are better suited
to protect the unique perspectives of Native American peoples.
Recognizing an individual's property interests in her own body, tissues,
fluids, and genetic information would allow each member of a tribe to protect
her own cultural and religious privacy. Recognized property rights would
allow each person to determine if and when she would like to contribute her
body, body parts, or genetic information to medical or scientific research. By
giving tribes and tribal members property rights in their bodies, body parts,
and genetic information, they would be able to bring effective claims against
those who misuse the body parts or genetic information.
VI. Conclusion
Property is best defined as the legal bundle of rights that include the "rights
to use, possess, enjoy, exclude, dispose, and destroy [a] thing."218 An
individual need not have all of these rights to have a property interest in a
thing, so long as he has at least one.219 Because individuals are permitted to
use their bodies, enjoy the fruits of the labor performed by their bodies,
exclude others from their bodies, make provisions for the disposal of their
bodies after death, or destroy their bodies by making poor lifestyle decisions,
they have functional property rights in their bodies. Courts and lawmakers
may hesitate to call these property interests, but in that hesitation, they place
form over substance.
If courts and legislatures recognize the property interests that individuals
have in their bodies and genetic information, individuals will be better able to
protect themselves from unwanted intrusions on their privacy. In situations
where researchers use an individual's body parts or genetic information in a
way he finds distasteful and to which he did not consent, he can bring a claim
for conversion, even after the parts have left his body.
Though the issues of genetic privacy are important to all, there are some
segments of the population where the risks of misappropriation of genetic
material are even more compelling. Native American tribes have been
marginalized, persecuted, and, more recently, subjected to undesired genetic
research. The federal government has a special obligation as guardian to
protect the tribes, and any threat to their cultural viability or religious privacy
is a threat to the sustainability of the tribe as a political entity. Congress has
passed numerous pieces of legislation specifically targeted at protecting the
218. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part, supra note 7, at 212-13.
219. Id. at 213.
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cultural and religious privacy of the tribes. The exceptions to the BGEPA and
the NAGPRA are examples of legislation that show the seriousness with which
Congress regards its duty to the tribes. To further protect these important
aspects of Native American culture, property rights in the bodies and genetic
information of tribal members must be protected. Without enforceable
property rights in their genetic material, researchers may continue to stigmatize
the tribes and imperil the very subsistence of their culture.
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